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THE COST DEFENSE UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT
In 1965, several Congressmen attempted to remedy the widespread
problem of age discrimination by introducing an amendment to make
age a protected classification under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 Rather than pass the amendment, Congress commissioned a
study on the scope of the problem2 and directed the Secretary of Labor
to prepare a report with specific recommendations. 3 In response to the
study, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (the Act).4
The Act is designed to protect persons between the ages of forty
and seventy.5 The legislative history indicates that Congress
determined that this group was particularly susceptible to unfounded
6
generalizations about the decline in performance that accompanies
aging. Congress sought to lessen the impact of these generalizations by
requiring employers to consider an individual's ability rather than his
age.7
The principal operative provision of the Act provides that:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directed the Secretary of Labor to prepare a
report to Congress detailing the problems of the older American workers.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT (1965) [hereinafter cited as Secretary's Report].
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967 & Supp. IV 1980).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (Supp. IV 1980). As originally enacted, the Act protected only persons
between the ages of 40 and 65. After considerable debate over removing the upper limit
altogether, Congress decided simply to extend it to 70. See, e.g., Amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Hearings on H.R. 65 and H.R. 1115 Before the
Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm on Educ. andLabor, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8-11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings].
6. See, e.g., id at 25 (remarks of Rep. Royval) (studies show no correlation between
chronological age and ability); id at 35 (remarks of Rep. Hammerschmidt) (the competence, skill,
productivity, and attendance of older workers equals that of younger workers).
7. This congressional intent is illustrated by the Act's statement of purpose: "It is therefore
the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age .. " 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's age .... 8
This language essentially mirrors that of section 2000e-2(a)(l) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,9 and many courts have used the similarities to
guide their interpretation of the Act.10 Nonetheless, at least one ques-
tion is unique to age discrimination cases: whether the greater cost an
employer may incur by hiring or retaining an older worker is a defense
to a charge of age discrimination. Because some costs are directly asso-
ciated with aging, such as increased pension and benefit costs and
higher wages paid to senior employees, the cost of retaining any indi-
vidual employee usually increases over time. Thus, if employers are
permitted to make employment decisions based on cost, systematic dis-
crimination against the aged could result."'
In arguing that the cost defense is valid, employers typically assert
that the neutral factor of cost controls the employment decision. Cost,
they argue, is a "facto[r] other than age"' 2 making the action defensible
under the Act. 13 The reasoning of the cases that have dealt with this
argument is confused and their results are contradictory.1 4 This com-
ment provides a fresh analysis of the cost-defense problem. First, the
background and the objectives of the Act are examined to demonstrate
that Congress intended to require employers to make employment de-
8. Id § 623(a)(1).
9. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(l)(1976). For a discussion of the significance that should be attached to this similar-
ity in language, see note 50 infra.
10. See note 50 infra.
11. For an example, see text accompanying notes 119-21 infra.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
13. For a discussion of the various defenses available, see notes 47-50 infra and accompany-
ing text.
14. See, eg., Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (costs
directly related to age may not be considered), a'd inpart, rev'd in part, remanded without pub-
lished opinion, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Reed v. Shell Oil Co., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 875 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (employer may evaluate performance and discharge least desirable
employee, regardless of age), vacated and remanded without published opinion, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th
Cir. 1978); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 737 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
(consent judgment) (employer may not maximize profits by choosing the younger employees for
trainee positions); Mastic v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (em-
ployer may look at individual costs as a factor in discharges); Donnelly v. Exxon Research &
Eng'r Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417 (D.N.J. 1974), a f'dmemr, 521 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir.
1975) (employer may consider cost relative to production in making decisions to terminate).
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cisions based solely on an individual's performance and ability. Is The
comment continues with a discussion of the one cost exception ex-
pressly included in the Act, which permits an employer to equalize pay-
ments for pensions even if older workers thereby receive a smaller
return.16 This exception further illustrates that Congress intended per-
formance to be the employment criterion, rather than cost. Finally, the
comment examines the practical effect of the cost defense in the context
of wages increased by seniority. 17 The comment concludes that, subject
to certain exceptions to prevent circumvention of the Act, termination
based on cost is consistent with the goals of the Act only if output,
rather than absolute cost 18 alone, is used as an element in computing
cost.19 The onus of forced retirement is thus shifted from those arbi-
trarily retired because they have reached a certain age to those whose
performance is below that of their colleagues, whether because of the
actual effects of physical aging or for other reasons. Thus, consistent
with congressional intent, merit is the sole lawful criterion for
employment.
I. OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT
A. Impetus for the Act.
Congress intended the Act to alleviate discrimination based on ar-
bitrary age distinctions.20 The Secretary of Labor's study found that
age discrimination is primarily the product of unfounded assumptions
about the effects of aging on performance2 l and a desire to reduce the
15. See text accompanying notes 20-46 infra.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See text accompanying notes 65-85 Infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 79-82 infra.
18. In this comment, "absolute cost" will sometimes be used to refer to wages and benefits
paid, and "relative cost" to refer to absolute cost adjusted to take output into account.
19. Although an exact formula could be proposed to reflect the effect of considering
performance as an element of cost, such asperformance value = or this comment
does not depend on any particular method of computation. The crucial point is that no employer
can gauge the cost of any worker without considering his performance. To illustrate, if the em-
ployer knows only that employee A is paid $50,000 and employee B is paid $40,000, he does not
know which employee "costs" more until he considers the amount each produces. Using the
formula above, if A's output is $75,000 and B's output is $50,000, B is more "costly" because he
produces less per dollar paid.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976) (stating the purposes of the Act, including a desire "to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment").
21. Secretary/r Report, supra note 3, at 7-9. Senator Javits remarked in Senate hearings that
"[We must break down the wholly irrational barriers to employment based on age alone which
have been permitted to hinder the older worker in a search for employment opportunity. Age
Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 andS. 788 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Labor ofthe
Senate Comm on Labor andPublic Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
1967 Senate Hearings].
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cost of labor,2 2 not hostility towards the protected group.23 Senator Ja-
vits, the principal sponsor of the Act, recognized the implications of the
findings of the Secretary while speaking in support of the 1977 amend-
ments to the Act:
[Mt is absolutely unjustifiable in this day of increasing life expectan-
cies to permit employees to be forced into retirement solely because
they have reached an arbitrarily established age. An age that fails to
take account of differential aging among individuals and different
effects of aging on various skills. It could waste well-developed abili-
ties and mature judgments. 24
Congress also considered medical testimony that there was no sig-
nificant relationship between chronological age and the decline in per-
formance that accompanies physiological aging.25 In 1979, when
amendments to the Act were again debated, further medical evidence
was presented to Congress emphasizing the individual nature of the
aging process and the unreliability of chronological age as a measure of
decline in performance.26 Typical of the testimony before Congress
was Dr. Stanley R. Mohler's 27 explanation of the crucial distinction be-
tween chronological age and the diseases that accompany aging.28 He
noted that a person free of diseases could perform many years beyond
any generalized chronological limits. 29 Consistent with Dr. Mohler's
position, Congress found that older workers are often rated more high-
ly than younger workers in terms of work quality, judgment, dependa-
22. See notes 33-35 infra and accompanying text.
23. E.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 6.
24. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1977- Hearings on S, 1784 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1977)
(statement of Senator Javits) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Hearings on S. 1784].
25. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2213, 2220;Age Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1967).
26. E.g., Age Discrimination Against Airline Pilots: Hearings Before House Select Comm on
Aging, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings]. In commenting on
the medical data on the aging phases, Representative Wampler stated:
The Committee certainly recognizes the deterioration of certain physiological functions
with age. We also recognize that the impact of these changes varies among individuals.
Thus, we hope to determine the feasiblity of measuring functional capacity on an indi-
vidual basis independent of the chronological age of pilots.
Id at 3.
27. Dr. Mohler had done extensive work on aging including four years spent with the Center
for Aging Research of the National Institute of Health.
28. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 70.
29. Id at 71. He concluded:
Across-the-board age limits that penalize persons who are free of impairing disease and
who are highly skilled and qualified at their chosen vocation are remnants of ageism
from a bygone era. We can and should let the healthy functioning individual who
wishes to continue to be productively, safely and gainfully employed, be so ....
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bility, and human relations.30 Thus, the Act's stated purpose of
"prohibit[ing] arbitrary age discrimination in employment" 3' reflects
the congressional consensus that generalizations based on chronologi-
cal age are not accurate indicators of performance, and that individual
ability should be the sole criterion in employment decisions.32
Congress was concerned about economically motivated age dis-
crimination as well as discrimination based on mistaken stereotypes. 33
The court in Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp. ,34 one of the better rea-
soned age discrimination cases, observed:
Cost differentials in employment have been denominated as the real
rather than imagined reasons for discrimination against the aged.
Higher employment costs may result from increased direct compen-
sation or benefit programs, higher training costs, and higher costs
brought about by the diminished productivity of older persons result-
ing from reduced ability or physical disabilities.3 5
If the Mastie court's observation that it costs more to employ an older
worker is correct, then any prohibition against age discrimination is
futile if employers remain free to make employment decisions based on
cost. The crucial question is whether Congress was fully aware of the
problem of cost and intended to preclude employers from circum-
venting the goals of the Act by using the cost defense.
B. Evidence of Congressional Intent with Respect to the Cost Defense
Generally.
1. The Denition of Cost. If an employer legitimately claims that
he must fire his highest paid employees to avoid bankruptcy, most peo-
ple would agree that such dismissals would be warranted.36 Since the
highest paid workers are generally the oldest, 37 however, these dis-
charges would warrant close scrutiny under the Act. Close scrutiny
30. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
32. See id
33. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 34 (remarks of Senator Murphy) ("em-
ployer discrimination results to a great extent from employer misconceptions about the perform-
ance of older workers and the relative cost to the firm of hiring older rather than younger
workers").
34. 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
35. Id at 1317 (footnote omitted). Several studies have demonstrated the strong correlation
between length of service and salary level. See, e.g., 3 MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, DEPT. OF
LABOR, THE PRE-RETIREMENT YEARS: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE LABOR MARKET EXPERI-
ENCE OF MEN 67-68 (1973). See generally, Suzuki, Age, Seniority and Wages, 113 INT'L LAB. REV.
67 (1976).
36. See, e g., Note, The Cost of Growing Old" Business Necessity and theAge Discrimination In
EmploymentAct, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 589-90 (1979).
37. See note 35 supra;
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would reveal that the cost of wages and benefits alone is not the true
measure of the cost of an employee. 38 An employer cannot know what
an employee "costs" unless the employee's productivity, or the value of
his output, is considered with the wages and benefits the employee re-
ceives.39 This formula allows an employer to determine his return on
wages and benefits paid and to compare meaningfully the return of
different employees. Although in many cases it is difficult to compare
directly the output of employees, the employer who does not attempt to
do so cannot recognize his most expensive employees or legitimately
claim that he must discharge them.
There is considerable evidence that Congress's purpose in passing
the Act was to encourage employers to base their decisions on perform-
ance. The legislative history emphasizes the need for evaluations of
individual performance. 40 Furthermore, Congress expressly enacted
two defenses to the Act that are designed to force the employer to focus
on the performance of his employees. 41 Finally, in the one situation in
which Congress realized that cost was unrelated to performance--that
of bona fide employee benefits-it created an express exception to the
Act concerning cost.42 These facts indicate that Congress did not in-
38. See note 18 supra.
39. In Donnelly v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417 (D.N.J.
1974), af'dmem, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975), the court approved a plan in which performance
was considered in determining cost, and the least productive employees were terminated. The
plan did not detail how the evaluation was to be made, but it applied equally to all employees. A
reaction to financial problems, the plan was designed to terminate "ineffective employees" whose
decline in performance may have been attributable to "[lack of ability or motivation" or to "tech-
nical obsolescence or declining value to the company of his field of specialization." Id. at 420
(quoting company policy). For further discussion of the plan, see notes 127-32 infra and accompa-
nying text.
40. See notes 20-35 supra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 47-64 infra and accompanying text.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This exception is the sole express provision
embodying any concept of a cost defense. Express exceptions to remedial legislation are normally
deemed to be exclusive. See, e.g., Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d
743, 747 (10th Cir. 1974) (if there are express exceptions to a statute, additional exceptions by
implication are not favored), rev'don other ground, 426 U.S. 1 (1976). The exception was passed
in response to the realization that older workers would be handicapped if they were always more
expensive. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on H.R 3651, H. 3768 and
H.A 4221 Be fore the Subcomna on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings] (Statement of Mr. Pestillo,
representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). Mr. Pestillo explained that an older worker look-
ing for a job would be handicapped because it would cost an employer more to hire him. He
believed that "if you saddle the [older worker] with the fact that he is going to cost the employer
$240 a year [estimated differential based on pension and insurance benefits] more than likely the
employer will find another reason for not giving him employment." For a more complete discus-
sion of the implications of this exception, see text, section I.C. infra.
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tend cost alone to control employment decisions. Cost was intended to
be only one element in evaluating performance.
2. The Unique Feature of Age Discrimination.- The Permissible
Classyler, Performance, Is Eventually Affected by the Forbidden Classi-
fier, Age. If the objectives of the Act are met, an employee cannot be
terminated because of his chronological age. But this is not to say that
an employee cannot be terminated once he begins to show the signs of
physical aging that affect performance. There are numerous examples
in the legislative history supporting the employer's freedom to termi-
nate an employee whose performance has declined because of demon-
strable physical aging.43 Only in the area of age discrimination do the
features of the stereotype associated with the forbidden factor, age,
eventually become true for the individual.44 Because of this unique
problem, the objectives of the Act should be carefully examined with-
out undue reliance on the interpretations of other anti-discrimination
statutes not designed with this problem in mind.45
In its present form, the Act reflects this feature of age discrimina-
tion. The Act requires employers to identify the point at which the
performance-specific generalizations about aging become true for the
individual. One corollary to this requirement is that employers wishing
to take action against protected employees may do so only after indi-
vidual performance evaluations. A congressional committee appointed
to study ways of improving the Act summarized this analysis by ob-
serving that:
Clearly, no employee should remain in a position if he or she cannot
meet its demands and the law recognizes this fact. But equally
clearly, no employee should be forced to quit or retire early simply
because of reaching a certain age. Such judgments should be made
on the basis of facts, not blanket assumptions.46
3. Abilty-Related Defenses Under the Act. The Act permits an
employer to discriminate based on age if "age is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
43. See, eg., 1977 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46, 88-89; 1967 Senate Hearings supra
note 21, at 37. (Statement of Secretary of Labor Wirtz).
44. See generally Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age
Discrimination Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 839, 848-66 (1974).
45. See Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1981) (age discrimination is quali-
tatively different from race or sex discrimination); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REv. 380, 384 (1976).
46. SpEciAL COMMITEE ON AGING, 93RD CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPROVING THE AGE DiscRuM-
INATION LAW iii (1973) (working paper).
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particular business." 47 Further, an employer can defend against a
charge of age discrimination if "the differentiation is based on reason-
able factors other than age." 48 Finally, an employer can "discharge or
otherwise discipline an individual for good cause."'49 All of these ex-
press defenses embody concepts developed under other discrimination
statutes.50
In most situations 5 1 a cost-based discharge defense should be
characterized as a discharge for cause.52 Characterization of the cost
defense as discharge for cause allows the court to focus on what is actu-
ally occurring in the alleged discrimination. An employer who has dis-
charged a worker because he is too costly may not legitimately advance
a defense based on high wages and benefits alone; whether or not an
47. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
48. Id For an analysis of the scope of this defense, see text accompanying notes 51-64 infra.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3)(Supp. IV 1980).
50. Similar defenses are provided for in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e -2(h) (1976). Title VII does not, however, have a discharge for cause provision. Nonethe-
less, because of the similarities between the Act and Title VII, courts have routinely applied Title
VII interpretation and concepts to problems of age discrimination. See, e.g., Hodgson v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying test for a prima facie case under
Title VII to age discrimination). The similarity in the language of the two statutes often justifies
the use of one to interpret the other. The statutory-construction doctrine ofinparimateria usually
applies because courts recognize that "a legislative body generally uses a particular word with a
consistent meaning in a given context." Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972).
Thus, two statutes with similar language that cover the same general subject can be construed in
parimateria, and language interpreted in one way may be used to construe identical language in
the other. Id at 243-44. There are, however, important differences between the two statutory
schemes that should act to prevent automatic application of Title VII concepts to age discrimina-
tion. See Note, supra note 45. If a situation arising under one act has no analogy under the other
act, then the reasons for applying inparimateria no longer exist. See 409 U.S. at 243-44. Because
the cost defense in age discrimination is one of these situations, see text accompanying notes 43-45
supra, the Act itself must be carefully scrutinized.
51. In the hiring situation, the cost defense presents unique problems. See notes 65-85 infra
and accompanying text. The "discharge for cause" characterization is also inappropriate where
the employer must discharge one of two workers who are both doing all that is required of them.
To take one example, if both A and B work on an assembly line and do all that is required of
them, it is difficult for an employer who is forced to fire one of them to argue that he is discharging
A for cause. Because the reason for discharge is the employer's economic situation, rather than
performance, this firing would be better labeled as based on "reasonable factors other than age."
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra for the
relevant portions of the text of section 623(0.
The cost defense has also been characterized as if it were a "reasonable factor other than
age." Eg., Mastic v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1316 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Note,
supra note 36, at 570. In fact, the two possible characterizations have been used interchangeably.
See Bittar v. Air Canada, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1136, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 1974) ("good
cause" analysis), a'd, 512 F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1975) ("reasonable factors" other than age);
Note, supra note 36, at 570 n.24. The exact characterization should not make any difference in the
ultimate outcome of the case since the employer bears the burden of proof for all defenses. See 29
C.F.R. § 860.103(e)(1980).
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employee costs too much depends directly on his performance.5 3
Therefore, to discharge based on cost is, in effect, to discharge for un-
satisfactory performance,5 4 whether or not such performance is mea-
sured relative to other employees. 55
There is considerable evidence that Congress intended to allow an
employer to consider costs in choosing between employees. The em-
ployer could therefore discharge his most costly employees, those with
the lowest output per dollar,56 for cause. Of the numerous anti-dis-
crimination statutes, only the Act contains an express defense based on
discharge for cause. Congress realized that at some point an aging em-
ployee's performance will decline and that at that point, the employer
should be allowed to discharge the employee.57 This is not a harsh
result. One expert, in explaining the workings of the Act, testified that
the provision allowing discharge for cause simply shifts the onus of
forced retirement from those who are arbitrarily retired because they
have reached a certain chronological age to those who are no longer
able to perform because of the actual effects of physical aging.58 Only a
retirement system based on performance is consistent with the Act's
stated purpose of "promot[ing] employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age."'59
An examination of the exception to the Act for retirement of ten-
ured professors provides further evidence that Congress intended to al-
low employers to discharge the most costly employees for cause.
53. See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text.
54. See generally Note, supra note 36, at 570 n.24. Arguably a performance discharge might
be characterized as a discharge for a reasonable factor other than age. The note, however, citing
ADEA Interpretations, 29 C.F.R. § 860.130(t) (1977), posits that the "'reasonable factors' excep-
tion is meant to cover a termination resulting from criteria or measurements that are applied to all
employees and prompted by considerations unrelated to one individual's changing performance
level." Id Thus, an ability-related performance discharge is not a discharge for a reasonable
factor other than age under the Act.
55. Most discharges for poor performance are based on a comparison of the performance of
the discharged worker to that of other workers. There are, however, situations in which this is not
the case. For example, if the employer has set some minimum standard for output and a worker
fails to meet that standard, the employer may discharge the worker without regard to any other
worker's performance.
56. E.g., Donnelly v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417,420
(D.NJ. 1974) (the employer identified the most costly employees as those who failed to produce at
least 75% of their wages), af'dmem., 521 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1975). For a critique of this method
of evaluation, see notes 118-37 infra and accompanying text.
57. E.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 37 (statement of Secretary of Labor) (arbi-
trary age discrimination is prohibited, but once the aging process catches up with the employee
and his performance falls "below the break-even point," the employer is justified in making a
decision based on economics).
58. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 141 (remarks of Dr. Marc Rosenblum).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
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Section 631(d)60 allows an institution of higher education to enforce a
program of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five. 61 The legislative
history indicates that Congress was concerned with the burden on uni-
versities that were being forced to retain costly tenured professors until
age seventy, and that Congress was aware that "although it is theoreti-
cally possible to discharge tenured faculty for cause, the difficulty of
objectively evaluating the performance of such employee[s] makes such
good cause discharges difficult."' 62 Congress's concern for this difficulty
implies that in other cases, in which performance is more amenable to
evaluation,63 the more costly employees may be terminated for cause
when their performance does not justify their higher salaries.64
C. Section 623(/)(2), An Express Exception, As Evidence of
Congressional Intent.
The existence of an express exception to the Act for the one situa-
tion in which Congress thought that cost is unrelated to performance is
evidence that in all other situations in which cost is directly related to
60. 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 631(d) provides in part: "Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65
years of age... and who is serving under a contract of unlimited tenure.., at an institution of
higher education. .. "
61. Normally, persons up to age 70 are protected from mandatory retirement. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
62. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977).
63. There may be other situations in which performance cannot be readily evaluated. For
example, it would be difficult to compare the performance of two supervisors in different, unre-
lated departments. Perhaps an analogy could be drawn to "bona fide occupational qualification"
(see 29 U.S.C. § 623()(1) (1976)) cases, in which the employer may use the forbidden classifica-
tion if there is no other way to isolate the persons with the unwanted characteristic. See, e.g.,
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). Applying this ap-
proach, if the employer demonstrates that he cannot objectively evaluate the employee's perform-
ance, the employer may use absolute costs as a basis for decision.
The existence of the narrowly drawn exception for tenured professors, however, tends to indi-
cate that Congress believed that relief was warranted only with respect to tenured professors. In
all other cases, an evaluation was apparently considered possible, and absent evidence of differ-
ences in performance the employer's claim that one employee is more expensive than another
must be disregarded.
64. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46 (remarks of Rep. Pepper, sponsor of the
legislation) (procedures for weeding out incompetent employees); id at 141-42 (Remarks of Dr.
Marc Rosenblum) ("Good cause" may justify discharging employees who become less competent.
It would not be an unreasonable burden to require employers to use performance, rather than age,
because management "should continually be reviewing their work force as a part of sound man-
agement policy, and workers incapable of performing their tasks properly should be separated").
See, e.g., Donnelly v. Exxon Research Eng'r Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417, 421-22
(D.N.J. 1974). See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra for an analysis of the situation in which
performance remains constant, but raises related to length of service cause the older employee to
become more expensive than a younger, newer employee.
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performance, Congress intended to permit employers to utilize the cost
defense. Section 623(f)(2) provides:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization...
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or
insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purpose of this
chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual .... 65
Statements from various Congressmen and experts, 66 including Senator
Javits, the Act's principal sponsor,67 indicate that this provision was
intended to allow employers to hire older workers without having to
incur the extra expenses necessary to provide them with pension and
benefit programs equal to those of the younger workers. Thus, an em-
ployer who hires a young worker rather than one in the protected class
cannot claim that his hiring decision was based on the cost differential
between benefit programs because he is not obligated to provide equal
benefits to the older worker.
1. Motivation for the Exception. One issue that arises is whether
Congress intended the exception to eliminate an otherwise valid cost
defense, or merely sought to remove an economic burden from employ-
ers complying with the Act. A review of the legislative history answers
this question and reflects Congress's attitude toward the notion of a
general cost defense.
Senator Javits's numerous statements in the legislative history
about the cost defense are entitled to great weight in defining Con-
gress's intent.68 Most of his statements regarding versions of the bill
that did not contain a provision similar to section 623(f)(2) indicate that
he thought that employers could not assert cost as a general defense in
making hiring choices. For example, he stated:
[The administration's bill] does not provide any flexibility in the
amount of pension benefits payable to older workers depending on
their age when hired, and thus may actually encourage employers,
faced with the necessity of paying greatly increased premiums, to
65. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
66. Eg., 1977House Hearings, supra note 5, at 19 (remarks of Rep. Cohen), 114 (remarks of
Dr. Marc Rosenblum, research scientist at the Center on Work & Aging, American Institutes for
Research); H.R. RaP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Weiss).
67. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 24-27 (remarks of Senator Javits) (The employer
must be given some flexibility or else he will be forced to "look for excuses" not to hire the older
workers).
68. See, e.g., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (a
statement by one of the legislation's sponsors should be accorded substantial weight in interpret-
ing the statute).
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lookfor excuses not to hire older workers when they might have hired
them under a law granting them a degree of flexibility with respect to
such matters.6
9
If cost alone were a legitimate defense in the hiring situation, no addi-
tional excuse would be needed. Therefore, the employer would not
need to "look for excuses not to hire older workers." Senator Javits
believed that absent the exception employers would be forced to hire
older workers and pay the higher costs unless they could identify some
other reason to avoid hiring the older worker. To prevent circumven-
tion of the Act by feigned excuses, and to avoid imposing a heavy cost
burden on employers to comply with the Act, Senator Javits introduced
the amendment that eventually became section 623(f)(2). 70
The testimony of a representative from the United States Chamber
of Commerce supports the position that cost is not a general defense.
Speaking in support of section 623(f)(2), he stated, "if you saddle [the
older worker] with the fact that he is going to cost the employer $240 a
year [estimated differential in pension costs], more than likely the em-
ployer will find another reason for not giving him employment."
71
Thus, the representative of the business community believed that cost
alone would not be a defense unless the express exception were in-
cluded in the statute.72
Some members of Congress, however, would have allowed cost to
be a defense under the Act. In a rather clear statement of intent, Sena-
tor Smathers, a co-sponsor of the bill stated:
[I]f the bill is interpreted to require employers to hire older workers
and to provide the same fringe benefits for them as are provided for
younger workers, regardless of costs, they would be given a handy
excuse for refusing to hire older workers. They would be able to
argue, with considerable justification, that their refusal to hire older
workers is not due to arbitrary discrimination based upon age but
instead is due to increased fringe benefit CoStS.7 3
Although Senator Smathers made some statements that cast doubt on
69. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 27 (emphasis added).
70. See, id
71. 1967 House Hearings supra note 42, at 70.
72. Other statements support this interpretation. Rep. Cohen, for example, spoke in favor of
section 623(0(2) and stated that:
[i]n order to avoid placing undue hardship on employees, it was the intent of Congress
[in passing section 623(f)(2)] to permit the hiring of older workers without requiring that
they be fully included in company employee benefit plans. This exemption was designed
to encourage the hiring of older workers without bankrupting pension plans.
1977House Hearings, supra note 5, at 21. Surely, if cost were a defense, there would be no danger
that a rational employer would continue to hire older workers and pay them equal benefits to the
point of bankrupting his pension plan.
73. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 30.
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his position,74 he apparently thought that an employer would always be
justified in hiring a younger, less expensive applicant rather than an
older, more expensive one.
Thus, there was arguably a sharp conflict between the sponsors
over whether a simple comparison of costs would have been a justifi-
able defense before the enactment of section 623(f)(2). The most per-
suasive position, however, is that when the costs to be compared in the
hiring decision are based directly on the age of the applicant, as are
pension and benefit costs, 75 cost is not a permissible defense. An exam-
ination of how the conflicting position works in practice supports this
position. Assuming that pension and benefit costs increase sharply at
age fifty, 76 before the exception was added, an employer who offered
pension benefits to his workers could have chosen the applicant under
fifty, rather than the equally qualified applicant over fifty, in every in-
stance.77 The older worker would have been hired only when the em-
ployer voluntarily decided to pay the higher costs. Thus, the Act would
have been reduced to a permissive rather than a mandatory statute, and
older workers "protected" by the Act would have been forced to rely
totally on the generosity of employers. This result was probably not the
intent of Congress, because the legislative history indicates that Con-
gress recognized that cost, not malice towards the aged, is the cause of
most age discrimination.78 Unless Congress expected employers to
change voluntarily their practices, it would not have permitted them to
make employment decisions based on differences in pension and bene-
fits before the exception was added.
74. For example, Senator Smathers insisted that the section that ultimately became section
623(0(2) was needed to be fair to the employer. Id This seems somewhat inconsistent with the
position that the employer could use cost as a defense, because if the latter were true any burden
assumed by the employer would be voluntary.
75. This situation would technically be labeled a disparate impact violation; cost, rather than
the age of the applicant, is the factor being considered, but when cost is directly linked to age the
classification has a direct and predictable effect on the protected group. The cost consideration has
a disparate impact in that the protected group is systematically excluded. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971). The next step would be for the employer to justify the
classification as based on "reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976). This
returns the analysis to the original question of whether cost alone was intended to be a permissible
justification.
76. The congressional hearings did not contain hard data on the age at which the pension
costs would increase. A direct correlation between age and costs was assumed. See generally
Secretary's Report, supra note 3, at 40-51.
77. This assumes, of course, that the employer offered a pension benefit plan.
78. See, e.g., 1967Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 34 (statement of Senator Murphy) ("em-
ployer discrimination results to a great extent from employer misconceptions about the perform-
ance of older workers and the relative cost to the firm of hiring older rather than younger
workers"). See text accompanying notes 33-35, supra.
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2. Effect of the Narrowly Drawn Cost Exception. Significant in-
sights into the status of the cost defense in other contexts can be gained
by determining why Congress chose to authorize expressly a cost de-
fense only in the very narrow area of age-based benefits in the hiring
situation.7 9 The legislative history is not, however, very helpful.80 The
reasoning behind Congress's decision to include a cost defense solely in
section 623(f)(2) can be gleaned only from a comparison of the opera-
tion of cost differentials in the hiring context, to which the exception
applies, and the discharge context, in which no exception was
necessary.81
In most situations the employer can make a decision based on
comparative ability, because he can balance ability against cost and
determine the relative merits of each employee. For example, if an
older worker's performance declines because of age-related physical
deterioration to the point at which he becomes more expensive, in
terms of productivity per dollar, than a younger, less experienced but
less well paid employee, the employer is justified in releasing the older
worker.82 In this situation the Act functions smoothly, because differ-
entials in individual performance control the choice. In the hiring situ-
ation, however, the Act does not function as well. For example, if two
workers of approximately equal ability apply for a position, but one,
because of his age, will cost the employer more for pension benefits, the
employer will probably choose the cheaper, younger employee. The
employer knows that in the hiring context he can only make rough
judgments of the employees' relative performance, based on their per-
formance for other employers. Therefore, the employer is likely to give
undue weight to cost, thereby favoring the younger employee. Section
623(f)(2) remedies this situation by allowing the employer to equalize
the costs, shifting the focus again to a direct comparison of individual
abilities.
Congress apparently believed that in all other situations, including
the discharge example discussed above, a comparison of cost to ability
79. That this is the only exception is reason in itself to argue that no other cost defense was
intended. See note 42 supra.
80. The discussion surrounding section 623(0(2) centered mainly on the consequences of fail-
ing to enact it. See text accompanying notes 68-78 supra. There was no comprehensive discussion
about why other cost exceptions should not be permitted.
81. Courts often look to the purpose of a statute as a guide since differing interpretations of
the statute may result in very different practical effects. Clear analysis of purpose may override
even an express statement of legislative intent by the bill's sponsor. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311-12 (1979).
82. For a complete discussion of seniority-based cost differences see text, section II B infra.
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would not unfairly disadvantage the older worker.83 The legislative his-
tory emphasizes the importance of individual performance assess-
ments84 and contains repeated statements that employers are not
required to retain unqualified employees.8 5 Congress believed that no
broader cost exception was necessary because cost was a direct factor in
the performance equation, and a comparison of wages paid for work
produced would not unfairly discriminate .against older workers.
II. APPLYING THE COST DEFENSE TO DISCHARGES OF WORKERS
PROTECTED BY THE ACT
A. Availability of the Cost Defense in Discharge Situations.
There are several situations in which an employer might advance a
cost-related defense after discharging a person protected by the Act.
Most of these situations raise no serious problems. For example, it
would be inconsistent with the goals of the Act to allow an employer,
forced to discharge one of several employees, to discharge the em-
ployee who had the least projected long-range potential with the com-
pany. 6 Nor may an employer discharge an employee who is
unqualified to perform a new aspect of an expanded job classification if
the younger employee who would replace him is also unqualified and
would need comparable training.8 7 The most difficult case arises when
83. Such a comparison could, however, penalize older workers who have been given seniority
raises. See notes 118-42 infra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 47-55 supra and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1640, 1648 (N.D.
Ala. 1974) (long-range potential to the company may not be used as a justification; otherwise, a
younger person could always be preferred over an older person with equal ability) rev'd in part on
other ground, 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. E.g., LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 737 (N.D. Ga.
1976) (consent judgment) (a 57 year old employee discharged because he was not qualified to
perform the duties of his new job classification was replaced with a 27 year old employee who was
promoted and given training).
As a general rule, an employer may not use age as a factor in deciding who is to receive
training. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 661 (W.D. Va. 1977). A more
difficult problem is whether an employer may consider expected return when deciding who is to
receive long and costly training. The Department of Labor allows employers to discriminate
based on age in choosing persons for bona fide apprenticeship programs. 1977 Senate Hearings on
S. 1784, supra note 24, at 23; 29 C.F.R. § 860.106 (1980). In hearings on the Act, Senator Ran-
dolph asked former Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz whether an airline which invests upwards of
$250,000 to train a pilot over a period of three years would be required by the Act to hire a person
who is 45 years old even though the FAA rules force commercial pilots to retire at age 60. The
essence of the question was whether an employer could consider age as a factor in assessing the
potential for recouping the costs incurred in training an employee. Secretary Wirtz, after quoting
§ 623(0(1) of the Act, replied: "I would think where there is that much training requirement, that
that would be a legitimate factor, that you would weigh the period of the usefulness of that person
[Vol. 1982:580
Vol. 1982:580] COST DEFENSE
an employer discharges some employees because of poor economic
conditions and follows a policy of dismissing the most highly paid em-
ployees. This policy has, a disparate impact on the employer's older
workers"8 and sharply presents the mechanics of the cost defense in the
discharge situation.
As a prerequisite to any charge of age discrimination, the em-
ployee must establish a prima facie case. Several courts have held that
the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green8 9 standard, which articulates the
elements of a prima facie case under Title VII, applies to the Act, but
most courts apply a more flexible approach and use McDonnell Doug-
las merely as a guide.90 Notwithstanding the need for flexibility, some
generalizations can be made about particular types of complaints.
When an employee has been terminated after an individual evalu-
ation, his prima facie case consists of a showing that (1) he was in the
protected category; (2) his performance was satisfactory; 91 (3) he was
against the period of the training that was required taking full account of the cost factors and
human factors." 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 49. Thus, if the age of the employee were
to prevent the employer from recovering an initial cost outlay for training, the employer could
discriminate against the person either in hiring or in placement into a training program.
This raises the problem of how to calculate the employee's longevity. In the airline situation,
the FAA's age 60 rule provides a yardstick. In other situations, the employer could use age 70 as a
cutoff because persons over 70 are not protected by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
Should an employer wish to establish a lower cutoff, however, he would bear the burden of prov-
ing that all or substantially all persons who reach that age are no longer able to perform the job, or
that some persons who reach that age are not able to perform and it is impossible or impractical to
screen out those persons in advance. Cf. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235 (5th Cir. 1969) (by failing to establish that "all or substantially all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved" defendant was precluded from rely-
ing on the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception).
The Secretary's statement sheds no light on whether an employer may seek to maximize
profits by training the youngest people, or whether he may discriminate only as is necessary to
prevent a loss. In most situations maximization of profits is not a legitimate justification. See notes
119-24 infra and accompanying text. Perhaps, however, this situation is unique, and an employer
should be allowed to receive a reasonable return on his investment. Arguably, a person too old to
work the required number of years is not qualified.
88. See notes 100-17 infra and accompanying text.
89. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The four-prong McDonnell Douglas standard defines the prima fa-
cie burden which a Title VII plaintiff bears. He must show that: 1) he belongs to the protected
class; 2) he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and 4) the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applications from persons with similar qualifications after rejecting him. Ad at
802.
90. Eg., Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1977).
91. At least one court has held that the employee need not prove he was performing satisfac-
tory work if his prima facie case otherwise allows an inference of age discrimination. Seeid. Cf.
Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1974) (the employee
must show only that he was doing "apparently satisfactory work"). The Marshall decision is
correct in its emphasis on a review of the facts of each case, and this emphasis is not inconsistent
with requiring some showing of satisfactory performance. The original rationale for requiring a
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discharged; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected
group.92 These elements vary if the employee is among a group which
is discharged during an economic slowdown and whose jobs are dis-
continued or left vacant. Consistent with the McDonnell Douglas ra-
tionale that the requirement of a prima facie case is intended to
eliminate the most likely nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge,93 an
employee discharged after his job is discontinued must establish that he
was qualified to assume another position.94
Some employees can establish a prima facie case by proving the
use of an unlawful employment practice. For example, it is possible to
use statistics to establish a pattern or practice violation. In Schulz v.
Hickok Manufacturing Co. ,9 the plaintiff demonstrated that after a
wave of discharges, the average age in the job category at issue fell
from 53.39 to 40.75.96 An employee can also establish a prima facie
case by showing that a seemingly neutral classification factor has a dis-
parate impact on the protected class.97 In the context of the cost de-
fense, this is most likely to occur when the employer discharges his
most costly employees, then argues that cost, not age, was the deciding
plaintiff to prove a prima facie case was to eliminate cases founded upon the most common rea-
sons for refusing to hire or for discharging: lack of qualifications; lack of openings; poor perform-
ance; or a need to lay off workers. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). Because a frequent cause for discharge is poor
performance, the plaintiff should have to prove that his performance has been satisfactory or has
not declined substantially. He should not, however, be required to prove his performance sur-
passed those who were retained; proving that he is more qualified than others is not part of his
prima fade case.
92. There is also some dispute over whether an employee must prove he was replaced by a
person outside the protected group. Compare Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 408
(5th Cir. 1980) (replacement is a necessary element), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 100 (1981) with Bon-
ham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 195 (3rd Cir.) (replacement is not necessarily an element),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). This may depend on the facts of the case: replacement should
not be required in a situation in which the job is eliminated or left vacant for economic reasons.
93. See note 91 supra.
94. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120,129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S.Ct. 1439 (1982). Of course, if the reason the employee is not qualified is that training was
offered in a discriminatory fashion, the analysis would differ. See Coates v. National Cash Regis-
ter Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 661 (W.D. Va. 1977).
95. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
96. Id at 1213. There is, however, a danger in relying too much on statistics in age discrimi-
nation cases because of the natural tendency to replace retired workers with persons younger than
those retiring. Cf. Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977).
97. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (testing requirements had a
disparate impact on blacks); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff alleged that a college degree requirement for pilots had a disparate impact on blacks, but
the court held the requirement valid because it was job-related). Although it is not entirely clear
that Griggs can be applied to age discrimination, the Secretary of Labor's interpretative guidelines
have consistently indicated that disparate impact analysis may be used. E.g., 29 C.F.R.
860.103(f)(1) (1981) (physical fitness standards).
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factor. Provided there is a substantial showing that the most costly em-
ployees were the oldest,98 a disparate impact case would probably be
established.
Once the employee has made out his prima facie case, the em-
ployer can either deny or attempt to justify the alleged discrimination.
Assertion of the cost defense is a denial of discrimination based on age.
The argument is that the employee was not earning his salary. In terms
of the express defenses available under the Act,99 the employer usually
claims that the discharge was for cause under section 623(f)(3). In most
of these cases, the employer conducted evaluations and decided which
employees were the most expendable. In response, the employee often
argues that age was a factor in the evaluation, 00 or that the evaluation
was a pretext for discrimination based on age.' 10 If the evaluations
fairly measured performance, 0 2 and if the employer used the evalua-
tions to decide which employees were most expensive in the relative
sense, the courts have usually affirmed the discharge.
0 3
In Donnel l v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. ,104 Exxon had a
policy of discharging persons who were not producing at least seventy-
five percent of the value of their wages.10 5 The plaintiff challenged the
practice, arguing that because older workers were paid more because of
98. See note 25 supra.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (Supp. IV 1980). See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra for the
relevant portions of section 623(f).
100. This assertion brings the reliability of the evaluation into question. Assuming that cost-
based discharges have a disparate impact on older employees, see note 35 supra and accompany-
ing text, the employer must prove the propriety of the evaluation. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). The courts have tended to be flexible in upholding particular evaluation
procedures. The primary objective is to decide whether age was used adversely. Gill v. Union
Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). To use the language of the regulations
promulgated under the Act, age may not be the "determining factor" in the decision to terminate.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103 (c) (1980). See Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1640, 1648 (N.D. Ala 1974) (length of time to retirement was a determining factor in terminating
plaintiffs), aJ'd in part and rep'd in part on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
Generally, a performance evaluation based on objective factors will be upheld absent a show-
ing of pretext or discriminatory application. For example, in Marshall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp.
1320, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1977), the following evaluation factors were upheld:
(a) ability to perform present functions; (b) ability to adjust to the necessary changes in
the company's operation; (c) effectiveness on the job, with particular focus on supervi-
sory competence and past achievement in the context of Hills Brothers' present
problems; (d) versatility, with consideration whether the individual had the ability to
move into another area of operations; (e) uniqueness, considering whether the individual
had some special skills which were necessary to a particular function; (f) motivation and
initiative; (g) availability of replacements.
101. See notes 133-42 infra and accompanying text.
102. See note 100 supra.
103. See cases cited in notes 104, 108, and 114 infra.
104. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417 (D.N.J. 1974).
105. Id. at 420.
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seniority raises, they were more likely to be terminated.10 6 The court
rejected this argument, apparently failing to realize that an employee
who was paid more because of seniority raises would be terminated
before a younger, less expensive employee with equal ability. 0 7
Notwithstanding the overbroad reach of the decision, the court's recog-
nition that relative cost is a function of performance and that the least
cost-effective employees can be terminated regardless of age is
significant.
Similarly, in Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp. 108 the court upheld
the discharge of two employees who alleged that they were terminated
because of age-related costs.' 0 9 Although the court held that an em-
ployer can always discharge its least desirable employees after an ob-
jective evaluation," 0 the case in fact involved employees who were
regarded as too costly to retain at their present salary level."' In spite
of the correct result reached in the case," 2 the court implied in dicta
that absolute costs, rather than costs relative to performance, could
control a discharge decision. 113
Consistent with the view that cost is meaningless without an evalu-
ation of performance, the court in Schulz v. Hickok Manufacturing
Co. 114 held that when the evidence establishes that the discharged em-
ployee's performance was better than that of the retained employees,
the cost-based discharge is unlawful15 The court reviewed the em-
ployer's findings regarding the output of each employee to decide
106. Id. at 421-22.
107. The evidence in the case indicated that the plaintiffs performance was completely unsat-
isfactory. He was given numerous warnings in conferences called specifically to discuss his per-
formance. Id. at 420. Thus, the court probably did not perceive the situation as one in which there
were younger, less expensive employees of equal ability who were retained. The court recognized
the problem when it stated:
It would be unlawful. . . if an employer were to fire an older worker doing satisfactory
work who, because of his seniority received a certain salary because the employer wished
to replace him with someone else who would do no better work but who, as a younger man
with less senioriy, would do the work for less.
Id. at 421-22 (emphasis added). For a proposed solution to the problem of the effect of seniority
on wages, see notes 118-32 infra and accompanying text.
108. 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
109. Id. at 1305.
110. Id. at 1316, 1319.
Ill. The employees were offered other positions at a reduced salary. Id. at 1304.
112. The assumption is that the performance evaluations indicated that the employees were in
fact the most costly relative to their performance.
113. 424 F. Supp. at 1319. The court relied on statements of Senator Smathers in the legisla-
tive history indicating that simple absolute-cost distinctions could control the hiring decision. Id.
at 1318. But, as noted earlier, hiring is a different situation because performance does not enter
into the equation. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
114. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
115. Id. at 1216.
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whether the employer's determination of the most efficient employees
was correct.'
16
Although the rationales of the above cases differ, the cases are con-
sistent with the Act's goal of forcing the employer to consider the per-
formance of the individual employee." 7 Further, they recognize that
performance is a determining factor of cost. Based on these cases, an
employer is within the bounds of the Act if he considers performance
when discharging employees based on cost.
B. Factoring Out Seniority-Based Cost Differences.
If seniority plays some part in wage increases, then older workers
will generally be paid more 18 than younger workers of equal ability.
Therefore, if an employer must make discharges based on a compari-
son of wages to performance, older workers of equal ability will always
be discharged first. Resolution of this problem depends on whether the
Act protects the employee from a discharge arising from the age-related
cost of a wage differential based on seniority. Several courts have held
that such action is improper because it is based on a factor directly
related to age.119 Furthermore, Congress went to great lengths in the
Act to prohibit mandatory retirement or discharges based on an arbi-
trarily determined age. 120 If an employer could discharge an employee
using a cost defense when the wage differential is based on seniority, he
could evade the Act by giving each employee a nominal raise at the end
of each year of service and then occasionally "retiring" the most expen-
sive-and oldest--employees. 121
Although an employer may not discharge the more expensive em-
ployee if the differential is based on seniority, in most situations wage
differentials are the product of both merit and seniority.122 Thus, em-
116. See id. at 1215-16.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
118. See note 35 supra.
119. See, eg., Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (factors
directly related to age, such as expected future service, may not be considered); Donnelly v. Exxon
Research & Eng'r Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417,421-22 (D.N.J. 1974), (dicta) (unlaw-
ful to fire senior employee doing satisfactory work and replace him with less expensive junior
employee), modpfedmem., 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
120. See, eg., 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) allows an employer to retire a bona fide executive. But, to prevent
circumvention of the purposes of the Act, Congress required that the retired executive must have
held the qualifying position for at least two years. This requirement prevents employers from
transferring undesirable employees to executive positions and then retiring them immediately.
H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978).
122. See, eg., Donnelly v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 12 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417,
419 (D.N.J. 1974).
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ployers need a method which factors out the seniority-based wages and
compares only the relative performance of various employees. To il-
lustrate, assume that employee A, age 50, makes $50,000 a year and
produces $60,000; employee B, age 35, makes $45,000 a year and pro-
duces $58,000. The employees are close in ability, yet employee A,
who is protected by the Act, is proportionately more expensive. Based
on these facts, the employer should not be permitted to use cost as a
justification for discharging employee A because the wage differential
must be based on seniority, 12 a factor that may not be considered in a
discharge.124
The facts do not disclose the amount of the salary differential
based on seniority, but the salary differential is so much greater than
the production differential that some portion must be based on senior-
ity. Thus, the employer should not be able to argue that he has a pure
merit system and that he should therefore be able to compare the
cost/production differentials directly. Either the difference is based on
age, a factor the employer must not consider, or the employer is paying
the older employee more because he produces more. The proper solu-
tion is to require the employer to establish that the younger employee
he seeks to retain is more qualified because he produces more. If this is
done the employer would be justified in discharging the older, less pro-
ductive worker even if he were paid the same as the younger worker.
Thus, the older worker is not being penalized for seniority raises by this
comparison, and the approach is consistent with the course Congress
took in the context of age-related hiring costs.125 The approach allows
the employer to compare ability as if a pure merit system existed126 and
to retain the most qualified employee, the one who produces the most
relative to a salary uninflated by seniority raises.
In the above example, employee A is the most productive, so he is
the most qualified and may not be discharged because of cost. Even if
the output for A and B were equal, the employer could not discharge A
based on a comparison of relative costs because B is not more qualified
than A. This approach remedies the discriminatory situation discussed
by the Donnel, court, in which the employer has two employees of
123. If wages were based purely on merit, the salaries would be directly proportional to out-
put. There is, of course, the possibility that some other factor other than seniority might be in-
volved. Provided the factor is not tied to age, the employer could probably establish that it would
not violate the Act to make decisions based on that factor.
124. See notes 118-19 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 79-85 supra and accompanying text.
126. If employees with the same output would be paid the same except for seniority any pen-
alty for seniority is removed.
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equal ability but the younger one, with less seniority, is cheaper.1 27 Be-
cause the differential is due to age, the employer may not discharge the
older, more expensive employee. Under the proposed analysis, once
the older employee's performance falls below that of the younger em-
ployee, he becomes more expensive even if they are paid the same, and
a cause discharge is permissible.1 28 It necessarily follows that the older
employee is more expensive whenever his performance falls below that
of the younger worker who is paid less.
The proposed analysis is an accurate, simple way to factor out the
effect of raises based on seniority. Its major flaw is that it assumes that
merit and seniority are the only factors considered in determining sal-
ary. This can be remedied, however, because the employer remains
free to prove that any differential is not based on seniority. Implemen-
tation of this analysis might have the beneficial effect of discouraging
automatic seniority-based raises that are not based on merit, and en-
couraging employers to look solely to ability, furthering the ultimate
goals of the Act.
Critics might argue that the proposed analysis fails to allow for
situations in which the employer is having severe financial problems
and cannot afford to retain persons whose wages are inflated by senior-
ity raises. If the employer is driven out of business by the high cost of
wages, then all employees suffer.129 This seems to be crying wolf; the
employer is required only to retain his most qualified workers. Some
of the most qualified workers may have wages inflated by seniority
raises,' 30 but the older workers must be performing at least at the level
of the younger workers or they could be released under the proposed
standard. The most burdensome situation is when older and younger
employees have equal qualifications and the employer is forced to re-
tain the older but more expensive employees, and must therefore pay
the wages inflated by seniority. However, it is unlikely that this situa-
tion would occur. If the employer does suffer an unusual burden from
seniority-based wage differences, and he can prove that the differential
caused by seniority wages alone will drive him out of business, reme-
dial action could be taken.13' Absent such a showing, mere economic
127. See note 107 supra.
128. This would simply be the situation in which there is no inflation in wages because of
seniority. See notes 100-17 supra and accompanying text.
129. See Note, supra note 36, at 586-87.
130. See, e.g., Suzuki, supra note 35, at 73 (work experience is an important factor in seniority
raises).
131. Perhaps the less-detrimental-alternative standard used under Title VII could be applied
in this narrow situation. See generally Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.)
(application of standard in Title VII action), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); cf, Note, supra
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hardship does not excuse a violation of the law. 132
C. The Employee's Option to Show Pretext.
If the employer meets the burden of showing that the discharge
was justified, the employee has the opportunity to show that the justifi-
cation was a pretext for age discrimination. 133 In several cases courts
have looked beyond the employer's justification to determine the real
reason for the action taken. The cases fall into two categories, either
the employer's justification is a blatant pretext, or the testing itself is
unfair.
A clear example of a blatant pretext occurred in LaChapelle v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 134 in which the plaintiff was discharged after being
judged unqualified to perform the expanded functions of his job. The
evaluation was done fairly, but the employer violated the Act when he
offered to train the replacement without making the same offer to the
plaintiff.' 35 Thus, the defense of lack of qualification was a mere pre-
text for age discrimination. Another example of pretext occurred in
Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 136 in which the employer attempted
to discharge the oldest of his three designers by closing and then re-
opening his plant under a new name without the oldest designer.137
The employer tried to show that the other designers were more quali-
fied, but the evidence was meager and contradictory. 138
In Schulz v. Hickok Manufacturing Co. ,139 the court looked beyond
the employer's evidence that the plaintiffs performance was below that
of his co-worker's to determine that the test was unfair. The employer
had discharged Schulz based on subjective evaluations, stating that his
performance as a district manager was unsatisfactory. The court con-
sidered the statistical evidence, including Schulz's sales figures. It con-
note 36, at 587-95 (the less-detrimental-alternative standard on a much broader scale). If this
approach is used, perhaps the employees could be given the option of voluntarily forfeiting that
portion of their wages attributable to seniority raises. Arguably, however, the forfeiture would
violate 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (1976), which prohibits an employer from reducing any wage to
comply with the Act. However, such a practice would probably not be held to violate the Act.
Note, supra note 36, at 592 n.125.
132. See, eg., EEOC v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 632 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102
S.Ct. 113 (1981).
133. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (Title VII
racial discrimination action). See cases cited in notes 134-42 infra.
134. 14 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 737 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (consent judgment).
135. Id. at 739-40.
136. 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modfedmenL, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
137. Id. at 724-25.
138. Id. at 729-30.
139. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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cluded that he was more effective than the retained district managers140
and held that the subjective evaluation was invalid. 141 Other courts
have noted that sham tests or those that are administered in a discrimi-
natory manner are invalid. 142
V. CONCLUSION
The confusion in the courts regarding the status of the cost defense
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 exists
mainly because of a failure to consider the major purpose of the Act-
to encourage employers to consider an individuars ability, rather than
his chronological age. For employers this means that the cost of an
employee must be measured in terms of the employee's record of per-
formance. The Act's prohibitions are not violated if an employer iden-
tifies his most costly employees by using performance as a direct factor
in computing cost, so long as age-related factors such as seniority raises
are factored out. The Act was not intended to force employers to keep
incompetent persons on the payroll. Its objectives were to make per-
formance, rather than an arbitrarily selected chronological age, the se-
lection criterion, and to shift the onus of retirement from the
chronologically aged to the physiologically aged. The message of the
Act to employers is quite simple--consider ability, not age.
Terrence P. Collingsworth
140. Id. at 1215-16.
141. Id. at 1216.
142. See, ag., Reed v. Shell Oil Co., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 875, 877 (S.D. Ohio
1977) (dicta), vacatedmerz, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1978).
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